Gödel theorem proof

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However, in the case of Cohen’s result, there is absolutely no indication whether CH should be considered true, false, or perhaps lacking a truth-value. And with the first incompleteness theorem itself, the truth of the unprovable statement easily follows, given that the assumption of the consistency of the system is indeed correct.

(This undecidability result was first established by Church 1936a, b; the method of deriving it via the undecidability of Q is due to Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson 1953.)

Subsequently, a number of theories and problems from different areas of mathematics have been shown to be undecidable (see, e.g., Davis 1977; Murawski 1999: Ch 3).

4.3 Reflection Principles and Löb’s Theorem

Heuristically, one may view the Gödel sentence \(G_F\) as expressing its own unprovability—saying “I am not provable”—though, as was already emphasized, such claims should be taken with a grain of salt.

167–202.

  • –––, 1995, “Intuitionists are not (Turing) Machines,” Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 86–102.
  • Zach, R., 2005, “Paper on the Incompleteness Theorems,” in Landmark Writings in Western Mathematics, I. Grattan-Guinness (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.

    English translation “On Completeness and Consistency” in Gödel 1986: 235–7.

  • –––, 1933, “The Present Situation in Foundations of Mathematics,” in Gödel 1995: 45–53.
  • –––, 1934, “On Undecidable Propositions of Formal Mathematical Systems” (mimeographed lecture notes; taken by S.

    Kleene and J. Rosser), reprinted with corrections in Davis 1965, 41–81, and Gödel 1986, 346–371.

  • –––, 1935, “Review of Carnap 1934,” in Gödel 1986: 389.
  • –––, 1941, “In What Sense is Intuitionistic Logic Constructive?” in Gödel 1995: 189–200.
  • –––, 1944, “Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, P.

    A. Schilpp (ed.), Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University, pp. For many theories, this is perfectly possible.

    1.2 Some Formalized Theories

    The existence of incomplete theories is hardly surprising. These two classes are easy to discriminate purely by their syntactical form. 2: Logic and mathematics, London: Routledge, pp. 203–223 [available online].

  • Barzin, M., 1940, “Sur la portée du théorème de M.

    Gödel,” Académie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la Classe des Sciences, Series 5, 26: 230–39.

  • Benacerraf, P., 1967, “God, the Devil, and Gödel,” The Monist, 51: 9–32 [available online].
  • Bezboruah, A. and J.C. Shepherdson, 1976, “Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem for Q,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 41: 503–512.
  • Boolos, G., 1968, “Review of ‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’, by J.R.

    Lucas, and ‘God, the Devil, and Gödel’,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 33: 613–15.

  • –––, 1990, “On ‘Seeing’ the Truth of Gödel Sentence,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13: 655–656.
  • –––, 1995, “Introductory Note to *1951,” in Gödel 1995: 290–304.
  • Boolos, G.

    and R. Jeffrey, 1989, Computability and logic, 3rd revised edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Carnap, R., 1934, Logische Syntax der Sprache, Vienna: Julius Springer.
  • Chihara, C., 1972, “On Alleged Refutations of Mechanism Using Gödel’s Incompleteness Results,” Journal of Philosophy, 69: 507–26.
  • Church, A., 1936a, “An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory,” American Journal of Mathematics, 58: 354–363.

    The word quickly started to spread of these results which apparently had great importance for the foundations of mathematics—though views on what really was the moral varied. There have also been attempts to apply them in other fields of philosophy, but the legitimacy of many such applications is much more controversial.

    In order to understand Gödel’s theorems, one must first explain the key concepts essential to it, such as “formal system”, “consistency”, and “completeness”.

    57–64 [available online].

  • –––, 2004, “How Carnap Could Have Replied to Gödel,” in S. Awodey and C. Klein (eds.), Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena, LaSalle, IL: Open Court, pp. Accordingly, \(F \not\vdash A\) means that \(A\) is not derivable in \(F\).

    To summarize: when it is said, in the context of the incompleteness theorems, that “a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out” in a system, this usually means that it contains PRA or at least Q.

    Thereafter, serious opposition to Gödel’s conclusions disappeared at least among those who were working actively in mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics. However, in more philosophical circles, some resistance remained. These numbers provide a way to talk about properties of the statements by talking about the numerical properties of very large integers.

    Well, think again. 87–117

  • –––, 1999, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic, Berlin: Springer.
  • Skolem, T., 1930, “Über einige Satzfunktionen in der Arithmetik,” Skrifter utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, I, no.

    gödel theorem proof

    \]

    It is always possible to choose the provability predicate \(\Prov_F (x)\) to be a \(\Sigma^{0}_1\)-formula.

    2.4 Diagonalization, or, “Self-reference”

    The next and perhaps somewhat surprising ingredient of Gödel’s proof is the following important lemma (we still assume that \(F\) is a formal system which contains Q):

    The Diagonalization Lemma

    Let \(A(x)\) be an arbitrary formula of the language of \(F\) with only one free variable.

    Now if we add it as an axiom, we remain consistent, but in this new, enhanced system, we can still compose a Gödelian sentence that asserts its own unprovability. In 1939, Hilbert and Bernays’ second volume of Die Grundlagen der Mathematik appeared, including a detailed proof of the second incompleteness theorem.

    2, Berlin: Springer.

  • Jeroslow, R., 1973, “Redundancies in the Hilbert-Bernays Derivability Conditions for Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 38: 359–367.
  • Kaye, R., 1991, Models of Peano Arithmetic (Oxford Logic Guides), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Kirby, L.

    and J. Paris, 1982, “Accessible Independence Results for Peano Arithmetic,” Bull. Let us abbreviate this formalized provability predicate as \(\Prov_F (x)\).